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TOXIC PALSGRAF: PROVING CAUSATION WHEN 
THE LINK BETWEEN CONDUCT AND INJURY 
APPEARS HIGHLY EXTRAORDINARY 
Rory A. Valas* 
It is no doubt generally felt that the whole subject of "proximate 
causation" is a bogey, the sort of thing found only in children's story 
books-a sort of child's mind creation. 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Legal, or proximate, causation is one of the most elusive and 
widely discussed obstacles to recovery for the toxic tort victim. 2 An 
actor can only be held liable for negligent conduct if such conduct is 
both the factual and the proximate cause of another's injury. 3 Much 
confusion stems from courts' varied applications of the term "prox-
imate causation." 4 
While the general doctrine of proximate causation itself is vague, 
courts have given widely varying interpretations to one rule of prox-
• Business Editor, 1990-1991, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, at v (1927). 
2 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984); Farber, 
Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1225-27 (1987); Comment, Personal Injury Haz-
ardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort Reform, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 797, 
823 (1983) (authored by Mark D. Seltzer); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1611 (1986) [hereinafter Developments]; Annotation, Foreseeability 
as an Element of Negligence and Proximate Cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942,945 (1965). 
3 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 42, at 272-73. The policy considerations that 
are now inherent in the common law rules of proximate causation, as well as the difficulty of 
distinguishing actual from proximate causation, contributes greatly to the confusion in cau-
sation determinations. I d. 
4 See id. §§ 41-45, at 263-322; Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 
MICH. L. REV. 543, 550 (1962); T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
NEGLIGENCE § 35, at 94-96 (1941). 
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imate causation in particular, upon which this Comment focuses. 5 
The American legal system has fashioned a rule of tort law that a 
defendant may not be liable if it appears highly extraordinary and 
unforeseeable that the plaintiff's injuries occurred as a result of the 
defendant's alleged tortious conduct. 6 The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts documents that rule in section 435(2).7 
Proof of causation in tort actions involving hazardous waste often 
involves a great deal of uncertainty in both the legal concepts and 
the scientific proof. Accordingly, the link between the defendant's 
conduct and the injurious consequences of that conduct often appear 
extraordinary.8 If courts apply section 435(2) liberally so that, as a 
matter of law, uncertainty in causation prevents the courts from 
holding a defendant liable, then the consequences could be harsh and 
unfair to parties injured by negligent conduct. 9 The courts, rather, 
should define the term "highly extraordinary" conservatively and 
carefully according to the facts and circumstances of each toxic tort 
case. 10 
5 See F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.5, at 168 (1986) 
[hereinafter F. HARPER]. 
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965); F. HARPER, supra note 5, at 167-68. 
7 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(2) provides: 
[d. 
The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where 
after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it 
appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the 
harm. 
8 E.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492,501-02 (8th 
Cir. 1975). See Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncer-
tainty in Hazardous Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 491 (1988); Farber, 
supra note 2, at 1225-27 (1987); Comment, supra note 2, at 825. 
9 In Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986), afl'd sub 
nom. Anderson v. Cryovac, 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988), primarily because there were other 
defendants that settled with the plaintiffs, very harsh results did not ensue from the application 
of section 435(2), which some have argued effectively relieved defendant Beatrice from liability. 
See Pacelle, Contaminated Verdict, Am. Law., Dec. 1986, at 78, cols. 2-4. Otherwise the 
results could have been deemed harsh and unfair. See id. at 75-80 for a discussion of the 
Anderson case. 
10 See infra notes 112-71, 208-60 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Illinois, 
for example, has defined "highly extraordinary" conservatively so that negligent parties are 
liable for the damage reSUlting from their negligence unless the link between the negligent 
conduct and the damage appears very bizarre. See Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 308 
N.E.2d 617 (1974); Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973). See also Nanda 
v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213, 218 (7th Cir. 1974); Lenox, Inc. v. Triangle Auto Alarm, 
738 F. Supp. 262, 267 (N.D. Ill. 1990). In Mieher and Cunis, the Illinois Supreme Court 
interpreted a passage in an article by Professor Prosser stating that highly extraordinary 
events for section 435(2) purposes should be "bizarre, unique," or "freakish and ... fantastic." 
Cunis, 56 Ill. 2d at 378, 308 N.E.2d at 620; Mieher, 54 Ill. 2d at 545, 301 N.E.2d at 310; 
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This Comment analyzes the application of section 435(2) in tort 
law with special emphasis upon its potential for use in toxic tort 
cases. Section II discusses the background of hazardous waste liti-
gation in this country. Section II also sets forth the shortcomings in 
the United States tort doctrines and legislation presently available 
to deal with the problems of personal injuries caused by hazardous 
wastes. 11 Section III presents an introduction of basic tort principles 
of causation in negligence actions. 12 Section IV examines the history 
of section 435(2) and its varied applications. 13 Section V introduces 
a hazardous waste tort case in which section 435(2) played a deter-
minative role. 14 Finally, section VI analyzes the potential use of 
435(2) in toxic tort cases and sets forth factors to be considered by 
the court before applying section 435(2).15 
II. BACKGROUND OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TORT LITIGATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Hazardous waste pollution creates a serious health risk to millions 
of people. 16 Pollution causes or contributes to a large and increasing 
number of deaths or serious debilitations from cancer, nervous sys-
tem disorders, or respiratory ailments. 17 The federal government 
has made progress by enacting and enforcing legislation to both 
regulate waste disposal and effectuate a hazardous waste cleanup 
program. 18 Despite these actions to regulate waste disposal and 
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 27 (1953) [hereinafter Prosser]. However, 
in this passage of Palsgraf Revisited, Prosser actually recommends a "middle ground between 
the restricted scope of the original risk on the one hand and the extreme lengths to which 
even direct causation may be carried on the other, . . . some reasonably close connection 
between the harm threatened and the harm done." Prosser, supra, at 27. Prosser also stated 
that "the basic idea [behind the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(2)] is there, that liability 
must stop somewhere short of the freakish and the fantastic." Id. 
II See infra notes 16-44 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 45-111 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 112-71 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 172-207 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 208-60 and accompanying text. 
16 Billions of pounds of hazardous waste are released into the environment every year. M. 
BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY TOXIC CHEMICALS 293 (1980). 
Studies have found that environmental factors cause 70% to 90% of all cancers. S. EpSTEIN, 
THE POLITICS OF CANCER 2 (1978); Comment, supra note 2, at 798. 
17 See Comment, supra note 2, at 798. 
18 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act (ToSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-71 (1990); Clean 
Water Act, 33 U .S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1990); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1990); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7641 (1990); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compen!j.ation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1990). 
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encourage waste cleanup, Congress has not passed any legislation 
providing a regulated system of compensation for personal injuries 
that result from toxic pollution. 19 
In a compromise for dropping personal injury compensation pro-
visions from the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),20 Congress created a study 
group to recommend changes in the legal system to reduce the 
difficulties that victims personally injured by hazardous wastes face 
in trying to recover adequate compensation.21 The study group found 
many obstacles to recovery for the toxic tort plaintiff.22 They found 
that high causation standards, difficult and uncertain burdens of 
proof, scientific uncertainty, restrictive statutes of limitations, uni-
dentifiable or insolvent defendants, inadequate insurance coverage, 
and prohibitively high litigation costs all combine to prevent toxic 
tort plaintiffs from recovering.23 To eliminate some of these obsta-
cles, the study group recommended modifications in the present toxic 
tort system.24 Actions to improve the tort system could include 
enacting, on the federal or state level, a discovery rule for statutes 
of limitation purposes and a rule of strict liability for responsible 
parties.25 Furthermore, some commentators have proposed that the 
19 Frost, Superfund Issues, in TOXIC TORTS: LITIGATION IN HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE 
CASES 269,296 (G. Nothstein ed. 1984). Congress has voted upon bills that would have created 
a system to promote compensation for personal injury hazardous waste victims. Congress, 
however, did not pass the bills into law. E.g., 131 CONGo REC. 411, 574-86 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 
1985); see Comment, supra note 2, at 806--07; Developments, supra note 2, at 1602. 
20 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1990). 
21 Id. at § 9651(e). See H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 84-90, reprinted in 
1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2866-72 [hereinafter House Report on SARA]. 
22 Id. 
23 SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY GROUP, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND 
DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, 
A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 301(E) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980273 (Comm. Print 
1982) [hereinafter STUDY GROUP REPORT]; Grad, Remedies for Injuries Caused by Hazardous 
Waste: The Report and Recommendations of the Superfund 301(e) Study Group, 14 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,105 (1984). 
24 See STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 23; Frost, supra note 19, § 10.17, at 297-99. 
Numerous commentators have discussed and suggested solutions similar to those recom-
mended by the study group. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 2, at 1602; Brennan, supra 
note 8, at 469. 
25 See STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 23. A discovery rule would allow the statute of 
limitation period to begin tolling when plaintiffs discover their partiCUlar injury and not when 
the act causing the injury occurred. Id. at 240-41. Some states have recognized that hazardous 
waste injuries can have long latency periods and have adopted a discovery rule for persons 
injured by hazardous wastes. Id.; see, e.g., RAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-513, 60-3303 (1988); RAN. 
H.B. § 2689 (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.100 (Vernon 1989). A strict liability standard would 
hold defendants liable for all injuries resulting from their handling of hazardous waste. Two 
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creation of an administrative board for the compensation of victims 
of hazardous substance pollution, acting much like the worker's com-
pensation system, would improve the situation.26 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act (SARA).27 In approving the provisions of SARA, 
Congress again chose not to enact federal law to deal with personal 
injury compensation. 28 SARA, however, contained provisions in-
tended to lessen the hardships upon plaintiffs suffering personal 
injuries caused by hazardous wastes. 29 For example, SARA autho-
rized the creation of an administrative body, the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), which performs health 
assessments and conducts toxicity studies of hazardous wastes and 
their disposal sites. 30 Moreover, Congress designed this research 
program to provide the public with toxicological information and risk 
potentials that can help plaintiffs meet their burden of proof in 
lawsuits. 31 Federal regulations, however, still fall short of creating 
elements that are often difficult for a plaintiff to prove, foreseeability and the defendant's 
knowledge of the risk they were creating, would be irrelevant under a strict liability standard. 
See Developments, supra note 2, at 1611-17. Such a strict liability standard would attempt to 
place the burden of the costs of hazardous waste injuries and the risks of harm on the hazardous 
waste handlers instead of on the injured parties. Id. at 1611. 
26 Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance 
Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 683, 730 (1977); Developments, supra note 
2, at 1631-37. A recurring complaint in toxic tort cases is the large amount of scientific 
evidence that is necessary. Soble, supra, at 706. This evidence is often too complicated for a 
lay jury to comprehend. An administrative body created to deal with hazardous waste victims 
would be made up of experts in the hazardous waste field so that claims would be dealt with 
quickly and efficiently. Developments, supra note 2, at 1633--34. Under such a plan, all 
citizens-not just workers----could be entitled to compensation for injuries caused by hazardous 
substances. Soble, supra, at 718-19. 
27 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 
1613 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1990)). For 
SARA's history, see House Report on SARA, supra note 21, at 84-90, reprinted in 1986 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2835. 
28 Representative Barney Frank submitted a SARA amendment that would have given 
personal injury victims of hazardous wastes a right to sue in federal court under the Superfund. 
H.R. 3852, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONGo REC. H11,574 (1985). The amendment was 
defeated in the House of Representatives by a vote of 162 to 261. Id. at H11,585-86. Those 
opposed to the amendment argued that the current victim compensation tort remedies are 
adequate, that the creation of a federal cause of action would place an excessive insurance 
burden on parties responsible for hazardous wastes, and that such an amendment would cause 
an excessive amount of civil litigation in the federal courts. Id. at Hll,575-85. 
29 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1990); House Report on SARA, supra note 21, at 84-90, 
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2835,2866-72. 
30 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i). 
31 House Report on SARA, supra note 21, at 84-90, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS at 2835, 2866-72. 
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a private cause of action for personal injury damages caused by 
hazardous wastes. 32 
Like the federal government, most states also have declined to 
adopt hazardous waste personal injury compensation statutes. 33 
Some states, however, including Alaska, California, Minnesota, and 
New Jersey, have passed legislation related to compensation for 
hazardous waste victims. 34 This legislation greatly contributes to 
victim recovery, but it still has only limited applications.35 Because 
most states still refuse to create statutory causes of actions for toxic 
tort victims, almost all victims of hazardous wastes are left to seek 
damages solely on a common law tort basis. 36 
A plaintiff claiming damages for a toxic tort can attempt to bring 
a common law action applying any or all of the following theories of 
liability: trespass, negligence, nuisance, or strict liability.37 Most 
plaintiffs claiming personal injury from hazardous wastes must at-
tempt to prove that the defendant was negligent. 38 To prevail on a 
32 Representative Glickman stated that it is better not to have a federal cause of action for 
persons injured by hazardous wastes. H.R. 3852, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONGo REC. 
HU,577 (1985). See supra note 28. A majority of the House of Representatives demonstrated 
their agreement with Representative Glickman by defeating the bill that was presented by 
Barney Frank to establish a federal statutory remedy for hazardous waste personal injuries. 
H.R. 3852, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONGo REC. at HU,585-86 (1985). 
33 Developments, supra note 2, at 1602. 
S4 See ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1987); The Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Sub-
stance Account Act of 1981 (the California Superfund), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§§ 25,300-25,395 (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § U5B.05 (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13:1E-62 (West 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143.215.75-.98 (1990). The fact that an increasing 
number of states are adopting statutes to deal with hazardous waste personal injury claims 
may indicate a trend. Other states and perhaps even the United States Congress may follow 
their lead. 
S5 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25,300-25,395 (West 1989). The California Super-
fund creates an account funded by hazardous waste taxes to pay some of the damages claimed 
by a party injured by hazardous wastes. [d. § 25,372. Damages are limited to uninsured 
medical expenses and 80% of lost wages to a limit of $15,000 per year for three years. [d. 
§ 25,375. The fund does not cover damages from long-term exposure to air pollutants, and 
claimants must prove that they are not able to obtain a court judgment against a responsible 
party because the responsible party either does not exist, is unknown and cannot be discovered 
with due diligence, or is insolvent or otherwise cannot satisfy a judgment. [d. §§ 25,372, 
25,375. Uncharacteristic of most states, Minnesota enacted a statute that holds all who are 
responsible for the release of hazardous substances strictly liable for all damages including 
death, personal injury, and disease. MINN. STAT. ANN. § U5B.05 (West 1987). Various 
statutory defenses, however, are available to the defendant, and the statute applies only to 
hazardous wastes defined by the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(a) (1990). [d. 
36 Developments, supra note 2, at 1602. 
37 See Pollan, Theories of Liability, in TOXIC TORTS: LITIGATION IN HAZARDOUS SUB-
STANCE CASES 301 (G. Nothstein ed. 1984). 
38 Most courts consistently have determined that hazardous waste generation or disposal 
is either not ultrahazardous activity or does not involve the requisite intent to invoke the 
application of strict liability. [d. at 318-24; see, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-
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negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove four distinct elements.39 
First, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a duty of 
due care to the plaintiff.40 Second, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant breached the duty.41 Third, the plaintiff must convince the 
factfinder that the plaintiff suffered actual damages due to defen-
dant's breach of duty of due care.42 Fourth, the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant's breach was the cause of the plaintiff's damage. 43 
Causation is the element that creates the greatest misunderstanding 
among those involved in toxic tort litigation. 44 
III. PRINCIPLES OF CAUSATION IN TORT LAW 
A. Causation Generally 
Causation is based upon an analysis of the link between act and 
consequence. Viewed from a philosophical perspective, any act 
causes an infinite number of consequences. 45 Following this perspec-
tive to its logical extreme, one commentator reasoned that "the fatal 
trespass done by Eve was cause of all our woe."46 It is well settled 
1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986), aff'd sub nom. Anderson v. Cryovac, 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 
1988); Ewell v. Petro Processors, Inc., 364 So. 2d 604, 606-07 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cert. 
denied, 366 So. 2d 575 (La. 1979); Developments, supra note 2, at 1610. As a result, without 
a statutory strict liability scheme, these courts have refused to apply strict liability in most 
cases claiming that hazardous wastes caused personal injuries. See, e.g., Anderson, No. 82-
1672-S, slip op. at 3-4; Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., 364 So. 2d 604, 606-07 (La. Ct. 
App. 1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 575 (La. 1979); Bagley v. Controlled Env't Corp., 127 
N.H. 556, 558-61, 503 A.2d 823, 825-27 (1986). See also supra note 25 and accompanying 
text. 
Some courts have determined, however, that the severe toxicity of the hazardous waste for 
which the defendant was responsible called for the application of strict liability. See Ashland 
Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293, 1307-08 (5th Cir. 1982); State, Dep't of 
Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 488, 468 A.2d 150, 157 (1983). 
Although a plaintiff may prevail on nuisance or trespass claims, the plaintiff still must prove 
that the defendant acted intentionally or negligently. See Developments, supra note 2, at 
1610-11. Nuisance and trespass are tort doctrines designed to deal primarily with property 
and not personal injury damages. Developments, supra note 2, at 1610. But see Nitram 
Chems., Inc. v. Parker, 200 So. 2d 220, 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (nuisance claim in which 
plaintiff recovered damages for personal injuries); Rogers v. Kent Bd. of County Rd. Comm'rs, 
319 Mich. 661, 666-67, 30 N.W.2d 358,359-60 (1948) (plaintiff recovered for personal injuries 
in a trespass claim). 
39 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 30, at 164-65. 
40 I d. at 164. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 165. 
43 Id. 
44 See id. § 41, at 263. 
45 See James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951). 
46 Id. at 761. 
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that defendants should not be legally responsible for every conse-
quence linked in any way to their wrongful conduct. 47 An essential 
element of a negligence cause of action is that there must be a 
reasonable connection between the defendant's conduct and the dam-
age to the plaintiff.48 A finding of liability for negligence must be 
based on fault.49 Proximate causation sets rational boundaries in 
order to determine liability according to factors like the culpability 
of the defendant and the strength of the link between acts and 
consequences. 50 
Liability may be found only when there is a certain threshold 
relation between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's inju-
ries. 51 In defining that threshold relation, a court applies a causation-
in-fact analysis to determine who or what caused an action and a 
proximate cause analysis to determine who should pay for the harm-
ful consequences of such an action. 52 These rules of causation, how-
ever, have been given varying interpretations according to the judg-
ment of the court and policy considerations. 53 Much of the decision-
making process regarding causation has been left to the discretion 
of the factfinder to determine whether the link between the defen-
dant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm is great enough to hold the 
defendant liable. 54 
47 See Cole v. Duke Power Co., 81 N.C. App. 213, 344 S.E.2d 130, 136 (1986) (citing Phelps 
v. City of Winston-Salem, 272 N.C. 24, 30, 157 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1967»; W. PROSSER & W. 
KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 264; Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An 
essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71-72 (1975). 
48 Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1257, 1288 (E.D. La. 1978); 
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 263. 
49 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 264, § 42, at 273; F. HARPER, 
supra note 5, § 20.4, at 13l. 
50 See F. HARPER, supra note 5, § 20.4, at 13l. 
51 See Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 112 (1963); W. PROSSER & W. 
KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 264, § 42, at 273; F. HARPER, supra note 5, § 20.4, at 13l. 
52 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 264-65; Vinson, Proximate Cause 
Should Be Barred from Wandering Outside Negligence Law, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 215 
(1985). 
[I]t's one kind of job to trace empirically the history of this planet's pollution (cause 
in fact) back to the ape who crawled down a tree, urinated in a stream, and first 
began upsetting nature's balance. It's quite another job to select, among a jungle of 
contributing factors, which polluting apes deserve fine or jail for contaminating 
Mother Earth. 
Vinson, supra, at 215. 
53 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 263-64. In his dissent to Palsgrafv. 
Long Island Railroad, Judge Andrews stated that, although decisions should be made that 
are "practical and in keeping with the general understanding of [humanity]," there is "little 
to guide us other than common sense." 248 N.Y. 339, 354-55, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928) 
(Andrews, J., dissenting). 
54 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 42, at 272-73. A court often first 
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Causation-in-fact determinations are essential to a finding of legal 
causation and usually are made before examining proximate causa-
tion. 55 Causation-in-fact exists if the damage to the plaintiff would 
not have occurred "but for" the defendant's conduct. 56 Alternatively, 
causation-in-fact may be found if it is "more likely than not" that the 
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in producing the plain-
tiff's injuries. 57 Today, courts generally apply this more-likely-than-
not substantial factor rule to all determinations of causation-in-fact. 58 
The District Court for the District of Utah took a different ap-
proach to causation-in-fact determinations in Allen v. United 
States. 59 The court applied a liberal substantial factor test to estab-
lish that the defendant's unreasonable creation of risk by exposing 
the plaintiffs to ionizing radiation was a cause of the injuries, includ-
ing cancer, suffered by the plaintiffs.60 Although the decision of the 
district court was reversed on the grounds of sovereign immunity, 
the case sets forth important principals of causation. 61 The court 
rejected the use of "but for" or "more likely than not" tests and 
found that the defendant caused the plaintiffs' injuries because a 
substantial "causal linkage" existed between the defendant's unrea-
sonable contribution to a risk of injury and the plaintiffs' actual 
injuries. 62 The court applied this substantial-causal-linkage test, 
determines causation-in-fact issues to establish whether some nexus between a defendant's 
conduct and the plaintiff's injury exists. If causation-in-fact is established, the court then 
makes findings regarding proximate cause to determine whether the nexus is reasonably 
sufficient for the defendant to be held liable. Id. 
55 Id. 
66 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 266-68. 
57 Id. at 268-69; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-432 (1965). The "substantial 
factor" test was applied first to deal with cases involving the possibility of multiple causes. In 
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway, 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 
(1920), two defendants each negligently started a separate uncontrollable fire that combined 
and damaged the plaintiff's property. Id. at 436-37, 179 N.W. at 47. Applying "but for" 
causation would have allowed both defendants to escape liability for their negligent conduct 
because each defendant could argue that the plaintiff would have been damaged even if either 
one of the negligently started fires never occurred. The substantial factor rule thus was 
applied to hold both responsible parties liable. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 431 comment a (1965). 
58 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 267. 
59 588 F. Supp. 247, 260 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 1004 (1988) (the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court 
opinion on the grounds of sovereign immunity). 
60 Id. The district court judge stated that "[i]n the pragmatic world of 'fact' the court passes 
judgment on the probable. Dispute resolution demands rational decision, not perfect knowl-
edge." Id. 
61 Allen, 816 F.2d at 1424. 
62 Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 260. 
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rather than the more common more-likely-than-not causation test, 
to determine causation-in-fact because there were many factors that 
could cause or influence the toxic tort injuries in question.63 Once a 
court finds that a defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of the 
plaintiff's injury, the court then must determine whether the defen-
dant should be held legally responsible for the plaintiff's injury. 64 
Courts have developed the legal doctrine of proximate cause to 
evaluate the varied causes-in-fact of an event and incorporate policy 
considerations into liability determinations.65 Proximate cause is a 
policy-oriented doctrine designed to be a method for limiting liability 
after cause-in-fact has been established. 66 Courts may consider many 
different factors in determining proximate cause.67 For example, 
courts have considered the foreseeability of consequences, the rea-
sonableness of the defendant's conduct in relation to foreseeable 
risks, the directness between the causal links, and the existence of 
abnormal intervening forces in proximate cause decisions. 68 
B. Foreseeability in Torts 
Although foreseeability plays an important role in negligence de-
terminations, the exact role it plays is unclear.69 The role of foresee-
63 Id. See Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: 
The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 583-84 
(1983). 
64 Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 260; see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 42, at 272-
73; Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 72-75 (1956); Thode, The 
Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause-In-Fact, 46 TEX. L. REV. 423, 
434 (1968). See also Keeton, Causation, 28 S. TEX. L.J. 231, 232 (1986). "Factual causation 
refers to the requirement that the act and the injury be related. Legal causation refers to the 
requirement that the act and the injury be reasonably related." Id. 
66 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 264; Brennan, supra note 8, at 484. 
Many cases have found that fairness and policy considerations must enter into causation 
assessments. See, e.g., Finney v. Ren-Bar, Inc., 229 N.J. Super. Ct. 295, 302, 551 A.2d 535, 
539 (1988) (citing Griesenback by Kuttner v. Walker, 199 N.J. Super. Ct. 132, 139,488 A.2d 
1038, 1042 (1965». 
66 Some of the public policy considerations applied to relieve of liability a party whose 
conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm include: the remoteness of the injury from 
the negligence, the extent to which the injury is out of proportion to the negligent party's 
culpability, the unreasonableness of the burden upon the tortfeasor if recovery were allowed, 
the precedential effect in promoting fraudulent claims or in entering a field where there would 
be no reasonable stopping point, or the highly extraordinary nature of the negligent act 
bringing about the harm. Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 737, 275 
N.W.2d 660, 667 (1979). 
87 See id. 
63 See id.; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, §§ 42-44; Palsgraf v. Long Island 
R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 347-56, 162 N.E. 99, 101-05 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
69 See F. HARPER, supra note 5, § 20.5, at 133-37; Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 
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ability should depend, to a great extent, upon our thoughts about 
just limits to legal responsibility in any particular case. 70 The wide 
variety of applications for foreseeability in negligence cases demon-
strates its uncertain role. 71 
Some courts have found that foreseeability is irrelevant to cau-
sation determinations.72 Tort theorist Leon Green stated that fore-
seeability or probability considerations confuse causation and should 
be applied only to damage questions. 73 Green would sum up the 
negligence determination into a duty formula stated as follows: 
"Should probable harm to the interests involved have been reason-
ably anticipated as within the range of defendant's conduct?"74 Ac-
cording to this view, the determination whether the defendant 
breached a duty to the plaintiff is seen separately from causation 
determinations. 75 
Courts often apply foreseeability in determining whether the 
plaintiff was a party to whom the defendant owed a duty to exercise 
reasonable care. 76 These courts have found that if the jury deter-
34 MINN. L. REV. 185, 197 (1950) ("Attempts to escape from the significance of foresight in 
the field of legal remoteness are attempts to escape our culture."); Annotation, supra note 2, 
at 945. See also Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 462, 242 S.E.2d 671, 675 (1978). The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated that "[fJew areas of tort law are as beset 
with the potential for confusion as is that of foreseeability." Hall v. Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe Ry., 504 F.2d 380,385 (5th Cir. 1974). 
70 F. HARPER, supra note 5, § 20.5, at 137. 
71 See, e.g., Nelson by Tatum v. Com. Edison Co., 124 Ill. App. 3d 655, 659, 465 N.E.2d 
513,517 (1984); Little v. York County Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa. Super. 8, 13-17, 
481 A.2d 1194, 1197-98 (1984), appeal dismissed, 510 Pa. 531, 531-32, 510 A.2d 351, 351-52 
(1986); Brown v. Tinneny, 280 Pa. Super. 512, 514-22, 421 A.2d 839, 841-44 (1980) (citing 
Zilka v. Sanctis Constr., Inc., 409 Pa. 396, 400, 186 A.2d 897, 898-99, eert. denied, 374 U.S. 
850 (1962»; Wells v. Vancouver, 77 Wash. 2d 800, 805, 467 P.2d 292, 296 (1970); see also W. 
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 42, at 273. ' 
72 See, e.g., Mazzagatti v. Everingham by Everingham, 512 Pa. 266, 282, 516 A.2d 672, 
680 (1986) (Flaherty, J., concurring); L. GREEN, supra note 1, at 65. Foreseeability, if not 
applied in causation determinations, most likely will be applied in other determinations, such 
as duty, breach of duty, or damages. F. HARPER, supra note 5, § 20.5, at 137. 
73 L. GREEN, supra note 1, at 65. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 E.g., Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446, 452, 631 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1981); Little, 333 Pa. 
Super. at 13-17, 481 A.2d at 1197-98; Brown, 280 Pa. Super. at 514-22, 421 A.2d at 841-44 
(citing Zilka v. Sanctis Constr., Inc., 409 Pa. 396, 400,186 A.2d 897,898-99, eert. denied, 374 
U.S. 850 (1962». In Martinez, the court held that "foreseeability is not an element to be 
considered in determining whether negligent conduct was the proximate cause of an accident. 
96 N.M. at 452, 631 P.2d at 1319. Compare Martinez, 96 N.M. at 452, 631 P.2d at 1319 with 
Nelson, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 659,465 N.E.2d at 517. In Nelson the court found that foreseeability 
is to be used by a trial judge only in determining threshold questions of duty, but can be 
considered by a jury in its factual proximate cause determinations. Id. 
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mines that the actor's conduct was a negligent breach of a duty owed 
to the plaintiff, then the foreseeability and extraordinariness of that 
harm are no longer issues. 77 Under this interpretation, foreseeability 
is an issue for the factfinder only in determining whether the defen-
dant owed a duty to the plaintiff, and it is not to be considered in 
relation to determining proximate causation unless in hindsight the 
harm to the plaintiff was so unforeseeable that it appears highly 
extraordinary.78 Thus, a court usually will hold a negligent actor 
liable for all the harm resulting from the actor's negligence, whether 
foreseeable or not, unless in retrospect the chain of events appears 
highly extraordinary. 79 
Courts also have held that foreseeability is indispensable to prox-
imate cause determinations. 80 The Supreme Court of South Carolina, 
for instance, has deemed foreseeability "the touchstone of proximate 
cause. "81 Thus, foreseeability has been important in determining the 
extent to which defendants should be held accountable for their 
negligent conduct. 82 
It is clear that foreseeability can play different roles in negligence 
determinations. It has been applied to both determinations of the 
scope of "the duty owed"83 and proximate causation.84 Although the 
methods used in fashioning some form of foreseeability test may 
77 Martinez, 96 N.M. at 452, 631 P.2d at 1319; Brown, 280 Pa. Super. at 519-21, 421 A.2d 
at 843; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) (1965). 
78 Martinez, 96 N.M. at 452,631 P.2d at 1319; Little, 333 Pa. Super. at 13-17, 481 A.2d at 
1197-98; Brown, 280 Pa. Super. at 521, 421 A.2d at 844. 
79 Morgan v. District of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1102, 1110-11 (D.C. 1982), vacated on other 
grounds, 452 A.2d 1197 (D.C. 1983), aff'd en bane, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983); Lacy v. District 
of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317,320-21 (D.C. 1980); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 
(1965). 
80 See, e.g., Hueston v. Narragansett Tennis Club, Inc., 502 A.2d 827,830 (R.1. 1986). 
81 Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 462, 242 S.E.2d 671, 675 (1978). In this case, 
the harm to the plaintiff was unforeseeable and not a natural and probable consequence of the 
defendant's conduct. [d. at 465-66, 242 S.E.2d at 675. 
82 Rossell v. Volkswagen of America, 147 Ariz. 160, 168-69, 709 P.2d 517, 525-26 (1985), 
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986). In Rossell the court found that the defendant car manu-
facturer's placement of a battery system in the passenger compartment of the vehicle caused 
the plaintiff to be burned by battery acid when the vehicle rolled over during an accident. [d. 
at 169-70, 709 P.2d 526-27. The court refused to find that the replacement of the original 
battery with a much larger one interrupted the causal link between manufacturer's negligence 
and plaintiff's injury. [d. The court deemed such a replacement of the battery foreseeable. 
[d. 
83 E.g., Nelson by Tatum v. Com. Edison Co., 124 Ill. App. 3d 655,659,465 N.E.2d 513, 
517 (1984); Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446, 452, 631 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1981); Brown v. 
Tinneny, 280 Pa. Super. 512, 518-22, 421 A.2d 839, 843-44 (1980). 
84 E.g., Rossell, 147 Ariz. at 168-69, 709 P.2d at 525-26; Hueston, 502 A.2d at 830; Young, 
270 S.C. at 462, 242 S.E.2d at 675. 
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differ, the principle remains the same: liability will extend only to a 
reasonable limit. 85 
Whether the foreseeability test is treated as a question of duty, 
negligence, or proximate cause, a plaintiff needs only prove that a 
defendant could have foreseen some harm resulting from his or her 
conduct. 86 Liability can be found even if the defendant "neither 
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the 
manner in which it occurred. "87 When it is more likely than not that 
a defendant acted negligently, then the defendant is liable for all 
harm that is a natural and probable consequence of that conduct. 88 
When straightforward causation links are not present, or when the 
natural and probable consequences of a defendant's conduct are un-
clear, problems arise in determining whether liability should be 
found. 89 
C. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company 
In the landmark case PalsgraJv. Long Island Railroad CO.90 the 
New York Court of Appeals wrestled with the question of the proper 
extent of liability to be imposed in a case in which the circumstances 
appeared extraordinary.91 PalsgraJ created an enormous amount of 
discussion and reevaluation of the rules of negligent causation. 92 In 
PalsgraJ, guards on a Long Island Railroad train assisted a man 
boarding the moving train and in so doing dislodged a nondescript 
package from the man's arms.93 The package contained fireworks 
85 Nelson, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 659, 465 N.E.2d at 519; B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 139,538 
A.2d 1178, 1181 (1988) (the foreseeability test, whether in the context of causation or duty, 
"is intended to reflect current societal standards with respect to an acceptable nexus between 
the negligent act and the ensuing harm"). 
B6 Swearngin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637, 642 (10th Cir. 1967); Hueston, 502 
A.2d at 830; see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, §§ 42-44. 
87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) (1965). 
88 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 43, at 282. 
89 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, §§ 42-44. See generally Palsgrafv. Long 
Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339,162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
00 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
91 See id. 
92 G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 96-113 (1980). 
93 According to Judge Benjamin Cardozo, the facts of the case are as follows: 
[The] [p]laintiff was standing on a platform of defendant's railroad after hllying a 
ticket to go to Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the station, bound for another 
place. Two men ran forward to catch it. One of the men reached the platform of the 
car without mishap, though the train was already moving. The other man, carrying 
a package, jumped aboard the car, but seemed unsteady as if about to fall. A guard 
on the car, who had held the door open, reached forward to help him in, and another 
guard on the platform pushed him from behind. In this act, the package was dislodged 
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that exploded when the package fell on the tracks.94 The plaintiff, a 
prospective passenger waiting on the train platform, was injured 
when scales, toppled by the explosion, fell on her. 96 
The plaintiff subsequently sued the railroad company for her in-
juries, which she claimed were caused by the negligence of the 
guards. 96 The trial court found the defendant's guards negligent and 
returned a verdict for the plaintiff.97 The appellate division affirmed 
the trial court's verdict, holding that the conduct of the defendant's 
agents was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.98 The ap-
pellate division found that the guards' inability to foresee injury to 
the plaintiff from their conduct could not be a defense. 99 
The Court of Appeals of N ew York reversed the trial court's 
verdict and dismissed the plaintiff's case. 100 Writing the majority 
opinion, Chief Judge Cardozo stated that neither the guards nor the 
Long Island Railroad Company, which employed the guards, should 
be held liable for any and all natural and probable consequences of 
their conduct. 101 The court ruled that the plaintiff was outside the 
foreseeable zone of risk created by the guards' conduct, and thus 
the defendant, as a matter of law, did not owe a duty of due care to 
the plaintiff.102 Because it was unforeseeable and extraordinary that 
the guard's conduct could injure a party so remotely connected to 
that conduct, the defendant could not be held liable. 103 
Judge Andrews, in his dissent, argued that the negligent actors 
should have been liable for all of the natural and probable conse-
quences of their negligent acts regardless of the fact that the con-
and fell upon the rails. It was a package of small size, about fifteen inches long, and 
was covered by a newspaper. In fact it contained fireworks, but there was nothing 
in its appearance that gave notice of its contents. The fireworks when they fell 
exploded. The shock of the explosion threw down some scales at the other end of the 
platform, many feet away. The scales struck the plaintiff, causing injuries for which 
she sues. 
Palsgraj, 248 N. Y. at 340-41, 162 N.E. at 99. 
94 [d. at 341, 162 N.E. at 99 .. 
96 [d. 
96 [d. 
97 [d. at 347, 162 N.E. at 101. 
98 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 222 App. Div. 166, 168,225 N.Y.S. 412, 414 (1927), rev'd, 
248 N.Y. 339, 347,162 N.E. 99,101 (1928). 
99 Palsgraj, 222 App. Div. at 168, 225 N.Y.S. at 413-14. 
100 PalsgraJ, 248 N.Y. at 347, 162 N.E. at 101. 
101 [d. 
102 [d. at 345-47, 162 N.E. at 100-01. Judge Cardozo stated that "[t]he risk reasonably to 
be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." [d. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100. 
103 [d. at 347, 162 N.E. at 101. 
1991] CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORTS 787 
sequences were unusual or unforeseeable. 104 According to Judge 
Andrews, a prerequisite to liability is that the connection between 
act and consequence must be close enough for the act to be consid-
ered the proximate cause of the consequence. 105 Judge Andrews 
argued that only the remoteness of the plaintiff's injuries should act 
to limit liability rather than determinations as to whether the defen-
dant owed a duty to the plaintiff. 106 
Both Cardozo's and Andrews's opinions consistently have bewil-
dered commentators.107 Although the Palsgraf opinions received 
much criticism, they opened the floodgates for the application of 
policy considerations, proximate causation, and practical politics in 
negligence cases.108 Proximate cause continues to be an important 
factor in negligence cases despite the fact that many have recognized 
proximate causation to be an overworked and undefined concept that 
is improperly designed to cover a multitude of sins. 109 
The Palsgraf opinions espouse a general concept that liability shall 
not be found when the link between the defendant's conduct and the 
plaintiff's injury appears extremely tenuous. 110 This concept has 
been embodied in section 435(2) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. 111 
IV. SECTION 435(2) OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
Public policy dictates that defendants should not be liable for the 
highly extraordinary consequences of their negligent conduct. 112 Sec-
104 Id. at 350, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Andrews 
stated that "[elvery one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from acts that may 
unreasonably threaten the safety of others." Id.; see also Prosser, supra note 10 at 6. 
105 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 351,162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
106 Id. at 348-49, 162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
107 G. WHITE, supra note 92, at 96-97, 101; Prosser, supra note 10, at 31. Prosser felt that, 
although eloquent, both opinions in Palsgraf shamelessly begged the question of tort liability 
for extraordinary consequences and stated "dogmatic propositions without reason or expla-
nation." Prosser, supra note 10, at 7. 
108 Id. The popularity of the application of proximate causation primarily stemmed from 
Andrews's dissent. See id. Famous tort theorist Leon Green's comment that policy and the 
balancing of interests should be considered in judges' decisions without the necessity of making 
or following strict formulas was espoused by Andrews in Palsgraf Id. See generally L. 
GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927). 
109 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 263-64. 
110 See Prosser, supra note 10, at 31-32. For example, in Barnes v. Gulf Power Co. 
defendant was not responsible for failing to protect its own telephone repair personnel from 
the hazard of criminal assault by third parties. 517 So. 2d 717, 726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1987). 
III RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965). 
112 See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 354, 162 N.E. 99,104 (1928) (Andrews, 
J., dissenting). Comment c of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(2) provides: 
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tion 435(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reflects that pol-
icy.113 In a negligence action, a court may follow the Restatement 
and hold that a defendant was not the legal cause of a plaintiff's 
injuries if, in looking at the circumstances retrospectively and ap-
plying hindsight, it appears highly extraordinary and unforeseeable 
that the plaintiff's injuries occurred as a result of the defendant's 
alleged tortious conduct. 114 
The role of section 435(2) is not clear.115 Changes made by the 
authors in drafting section 435(2) reflect the uncertainty about the 
section's proper role. 116 The content of section 435(2) originally was 
listed in section 433(b) of the first Restatement of Torts as one of the 
considerations to be applied in determining whether the actor's con-
duct was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. 117 
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) transferred section 433(b) 
to section 435(2) because section 433 contained factors to be applied 
[Tlhe highly extraordinary nature of the result which has followed from the actor's 
conduct (with or without the aid of an intervening force) indicates that the hazard 
which brought about or assisted in bringing about that result was not among the 
hazards with respect to which the conduct was negligent. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) comment c (1965). 
113 Section 435(2) provides that "[tlhe actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause 
of harm to another where after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's 
negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought 
about the harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965). 
114 Id.; see Hoxsey v. Houchlei, 135 Ill. App. 3d 176, 181, 481 N.E.2d 990, 993 (1985) 
(because of the "freakish nature of decedent's unfortunate accident ... the accident would 
have been well outside the scope or range of such duty so as to render defendants not liable"). 
Compare Hoxsey v. Houchlei, 135 Ill. App. 3d 176, 481 N.E.2d 993 with Ohoud Establishment, 
Inc. v. Tri-State Contracting and Trading Corp., 523 F. Supp. 249, 256 (D.N.J. 1981). In 
Ohoud section 435(2) was applied to determine whether damages claimed were so remote as 
to bar recovery of the speculative damages. Id. 
115 See Annotation, supra note 2, at 986-88. 
116 Id. 
117 Restatement of Torts § 433 (1934) provided under the title "Considerations Important 
in Determining Whether Negligent Conduct Is a Substantial Factor in Producing Harm": 
The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with one another 
important in determining whether the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bring-
ing about harm to another: 
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the 
extent of the effect which they have in producing it; 
(b) whether after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent 
conduct it appears highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm; 
(c) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in 
continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a situation 
harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible; 
(d) lapse of time. 
Id. The change made to section 433 involved only the removal of subsection b. The rest of the 
section remained the same. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433, 435 (1965). 
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in determining causation-in-fact. Thus, the "rule of policy" phrase of 
433(b) confused the issues of fact required for determining substan-
tial factor causation-in-fact with rules of policy intended to limit 
existing liability.118 It appears that such confusion still exists. Some 
courts continue to apply section 435(2) for causation-in-fact deter-
minations,119 but most courts now recognize section 435(2) as a prox-
imate-cause doctrine. 120 
Case law demonstrates that there is uncertainty as to whether 
section 435(2) should apply to findings of causation-in-fact or to prox-
imate-cause determinations. 121 Some courts have found that the pur-
pose of section 435(2) is to determine whether any liability exists at 
all and not to limit liability already found to exist. 122 In these cases, 
the extraordinariness of the link between the defendant's conduct 
and the consequences of that conduct would be relevant for deter-
mining whether the defendant's conduct was negligent, but not for 
determining the extent of liability for which the defendant should 
be held accountable. 123 
In Mazzagatti v. Everingham by Everingham,124 for example, a 
concurring justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that 
section 435(2) and foreseeability have absolutely no place in any 
causation determinations and is solely for "duty" or "negligence" 
considerations. 125 This interpretation of section 435(2), however, does 
not seem to consider the fact that section 435 is listed in the Res-
tatement as one of the rules for determining a negligent actor's 
responsibility for harm that the conduct already has been found to 
be a substantial factor in producing.126 
118 See Annotation, supra note 2, at 986-88. 
119 See, e.g., Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446, 456, 631 P.2d 1314, 1324 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1981); Brown v. Tinneny, 280 Pa. Super. 512, 514, 421 A.2d 839, 841 (1980). 
120 See, e.g., Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 341, 430 A.2d 1, 15 (1980); Mitnick v. 
Whalen Bros., 115 Conn. 650, 651-52, 163 A. 414, 414-15 (1932); Morgan v. District of 
Columbia, 449 A.2d 1102, 1110-11 (D.C. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 452 A.2d 1197 
(D.C.), aff'd en bane, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983). 
121 See Annotation, supra note 2, at 985-88. 
122 Martinez, 96 N.M. at 451, 631 P.2d at 1319; Brown, 280 Pa. Super. at 514-15, 421 A.2d 
at 841. 
123 Martinez, 96 N.M. at 451, 631 P.2d at 1319; Brown, 280 Pa. Super. at 514-15, 421 A.2d 
at 841. 
124 512 Pa. 266, 516 A.2d 672 (1986). 
125 [d. at 283, 516 A.2d at 681. The term "negligence" in this context denotes duty and 
breach concepts in determining that the defendant created an unreasonable risk. Causation 
then would determine if the plaintiff's injury fell within the zone of risk. See Annotation, 
supra note 2, at 980-88. 
126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, tit. B, §§ 435-439 (1965). Section 435(2) is located 
in chapter 16, entitled "The Causal Relation Necessary to Responsibility for Negligence." [d. 
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Other courts have interpreted section 435(2) to create a threshold 
at which foreseeability and extraordinariness could be used as de-
termining factors in relieving a defendant of liability. 127 These courts 
found that the foreseeability and the extraordinariness of the results 
of a defendant's conduct can become determinative of liability, but 
only if, in hindsight, it appears highly extraordinary that the actor's 
negligent conduct brought about the plaintiff's harm. l28 In Morgan 
v. District of Columbia, 129 the court applied section 435(2) to a prox-
imate-cause analysis. 130 The court held that liability for conduct that 
actually produced harm extends to all harm, foreseeable or unfore-
seeable, unless it appears in retrospect to be highly extraordinary 
that such harm resulted. 131 
Confusion arises over whether section 435(2) deals with questions 
of law or questions of fact.132 Regardless of whether section 435(2) 
applies to a question of duty or causation, the roles of the court and 
jury in regard to foreseeability are an important consideration. 133 A 
jury answers questions of fact while a judge resolves legal matters. 134 
As long as reasonable minds could differ on a disputed factual matter, 
§§ 430-462. Under chapter 16 are topic 1: "Causal Relation Necessary to the Existence of 
Liability for Another's Harm"; topic 2: "Causal Relation Affecting the Extent of Liability but 
Not Its Existence"; and topic 3: "Causal Relation Necessary to Make Actor's Conduct Con-
tributory Negligence." [d. Topic 1 contains title A: "General Principles"; title B: "Rules Which 
Detennine the Responsibility of a Negligent Actor for Harm Which His Conduct Is a Sub-
stantial Factor in Producing"; and title C: "Superseding Cause." [d. §§ 430-453. 
Title B contains § 435A: liability for intended consequences; § 435B: liability for unintended 
consequences of intentional invasions; § 436: liability for physical harm resulting from emotional 
disturbance, § 437: actor's subsequent efforts to prevent his negligence from causing harm; 
and § 439 effect of contributing acts of third persons when actor's negligence is actively 
operating. [d. 
127 Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 341-42, 430 A.2d 1, 15 (1980); Mitnick v. Whalen 
Bros., 115 Conn. 650, 651-52, 163 A. 414, 414-15 (1932); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 449 
A.2d 1102, 1110 (D.C. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 452 A.2d 1197 (D.C. 1983), afl'd en 
bane, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983). 
128 Pisel, 180 Conn. at 341-42, 430 A.2d at 15; Mitnick, 115 Conn. at 651-52, 163 A. 414-
15. 
129 449 A.2d 1102 (D.C. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 452 A.2d 1197 (D.C. 1983), afl'd 
en bane, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983). 
130 [d. at 1111. 
131 [d. 
132 See, e.g., Brown v. Baltimore & Ohio RR, 805 F.2d 1133, 1137 (4th Cir. 1986); 
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 51 N.Y.2d 308, 414 N.E.2d 666, 
670 (1981). 
133 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 45, at 319; see L. GREEN, supra note 1, at 
65. 
134 See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 434 (1965). 
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a judge should not intrude on the jury's role in resolving that mat-
ter.135 
Most courts have found that section 435(2) is solely a matter of 
law for the judge to apply if appropriate under the circumstances. 136 
Section 435(2) gives the power to "the court" to make a retrospective 
analysis to determine whether the plaintiff's harm was highly ex-
traordinary.137 Thus, under this interpretation, section 435(2) will be 
applicable tmly if "the court," meaning the judge, finds that, as a 
matter of law, it appears highly extraordinary that the actor's con-
duct could have brought about the harm in question. 138 
Some courts have held that the extraordinariness and foreseea-
bility of harm are important jury considerations in negligence 
cases. 139 In Hall v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,140 for 
instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
reversed the district court's decision, stating that the district judge 
was wrong in concluding that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff's 
injuries were unforeseeable. 14l The court ruled that the jury should 
determine whether it was so extraordinary for the plaintiff's harm 
to result from the defendant's conduct that the defendant should not 
be liable. 142 
135 See, e.g., Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 112 (1963); W. PROSSER & 
W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 45, at 319; see also L. GREEN, supra note 1, at 65. 
136 E.g., Christensen v. Epley, 287 Or. 539, 578-79, 601 P.2d 1216, 1236 (1979); Brown v. 
Tinneny, 280 Pa. Super. 512, 514-22, 421 A.2d 839, 841-44 (1980) (overturned the trial court's 
verdict because the trial judge included the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(2) in the jury 
instructions). In Christensen the court stated it was 
not correct to simply say "foreseeability is normally a jury question .... " Obviously 
the key question . . . is whether the event leading to the plaintiff's harm was "so 
highly extraordinary that we can say as a matter of law that a reasonable man, 
making an inventory of the possibilities of harm his conduct might produce, would 
not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." 
287 Or. at 578-79,601 P.2d at 1236 (quoting from Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or. 
603, 609, 469 P.2d 783, 786 (1970». 
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965). 
138 See Brown v. Tinneny, 280 Pa. Super. 512, 514, 421 A.2d 839, 841 (1980); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 435(2), 453 (1965); see also Barnes v. Geiger, 15 Ma. App. 365, 368, 
446 N.E.2d 78, 81 (1983) (section 435(2) is not a strict rule of law, but a statement of policy 
to be applied at the judge's discretion). 
139 Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 434 N. Y. S.2d 166, 169, 51 N. Y.2d 308, 315, 414 
N.E.2d 666, 670 (1981); Bleman v. Gold, 431 Pa. 348, 352, 246 A.2d 376, 380 (1968) (in 
determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause, foreseeability and an appli-
cation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(2) (1965) should be considered by the jury). 
140 504 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1974). 
141 [d. at 387. 
142 [d. 
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Courts often consider section 435(2) in conjunction with determin-
ing whether superseding causes exist in a particular case. 143 When 
courts have found that the plaintiff's harm occurred as a result of 
so many factors that the defendant's conduct should not be held to 
be the legal cause of that harm, the court often will apply section 
435(2) to declare the existence of superseding causes and find that 
the harm to the plaintiff was highly extraordinary.144 If the court 
finds that a superseding cause existed, then the defendant will not 
be held liable even if the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor 
in producing the plaintiff's injuries. 145 Whether the intervening force 
appears extraordinary, in retrospect, is an important consideration 
in determining whether an intervening force constituted a supersed-
ing cause. 146 
Some courts applying section 435(2) have determined that, when 
there are highly extraordinary factors involved in the harm to the 
plaintiff, the defendant is not liable for such harm even if the defen-
dant's wrongful conduct was an actual cause of the plaintiff's harm. 147 
In Christensen v. Epley148 the Oregon Supreme Court held that 
actions of the officers of a county juvenile detention center who 
permitted a police officer to enter the detention center were not the 
legal cause of the police officer's murder by an inmate. 149 Rather, 
the inmate's conduct was highly extraordinary and a superseding 
cause of the police officer's murder. 150 
The doctrine of highly extraordinary causation also was applied in 
Hoxsey v. Houchlei151 to exonerate the defendant township in a claim 
143 See, e.g., Barnes v. Gulf Power Co., 517 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); 
Holbrook v. Peric, 129 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1000, 473 N.E.2d 531, 535 (1984); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) comment c (1965). 
144 E.g., Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 137 Misc. 2d 980, 523 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1987); see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965). 
145 Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 402 (Alaska 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 442(b), 435(2) comment c (1965). 
146 See Holbrook, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 998, 473 N.E.2d at 535. The court granted summary 
judgment against the plaintiff because the judge found that it was highly extraordinary that 
the mere fact that two vehicles, driven by the defendants, were close together would cause 
the plaintiff driver to become distracted, leave the road, and crash. [d.; see also Anderson v. 
W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986), aff'd sub nom. Anderson v. 
Cryovac, 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988); Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 465, 242 S.E.2d 
671, 677 (1978). 




151 135 Ill. App. 3d 176, 481 N.E.2d 990 (1985). 
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for wrongful death. 152 In Hoxsey, the plaintiff was carried away by 
flood waters when she left her vehicle after it stalled during an 
attempt to cross a flooded town road. 153 The plaintiff claimed that 
the town's negligent maintenance of the road caused it to flood. l54 
The Illinois Appellate Court held that the plaintiff's conduct was 
highly extraordinary and, therefore, the town's negligent actions 
were not a cause of her death. 155 
In many cases, courts have decided not to apply the section 435(2) 
bar on liability because they did not identify the causation sequence 
as so highly extraordinary that it should prevent the defendant from 
being held liable. 156 In Nanda v. Ford Motor CO.,157 a Ford Pinto 
case, the plaintiff was injured when flames shot into the passenger 
compartment of her vehicle after the vehicle was struck from be-
hind. l58 The court did not find the circumstances so highly extraor-
dinary that the defendant should not be liable. 159 Thus, the court 
held that the defendant car manufacturer's failure to build a fire wall 
between the rear fuel tank and the passenger compartment caused 
the plaintiff's injuries, and the defendant was therefore liable. 160 In 
Smith v. J.C. Penney CO.161 the plaintiff was injured when her highly 
flammable synthetic fur coat made by the defendant J.C. Penney 
burst into flames. 162 A gas fire caused by the negligence of the co-
152 Id. at 181, 481 N.E.2d at 993. 
153 Id. at 177-78, 481 N.E.2d at 990-91. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 See, e.g., Petraglia v. Moller & Rothe, Inc., 119 A.D.2d 494,500,500 N.Y.S.2d 690, 
692 (1986) (trial court's directed verdict reversed because the appellate court did not find it 
highly extraordinary that an inadequately secured door in the defendant's office would fall 
and seriously injure the plaintiff, a cleaning woman); Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 
Or. 603, 609, 469 P.2d 783, 786 (1970) (the court found it foreseeable and not highly extraor-
dinary for a firefighter, while fighting a fire negligently started by the defendant, to fall 
through a skylight of an adjacent building); Andor v. United Air Lines, 79 Or. App. 311, 318-
19, 719 P.2d 492, 497, 499 (1986). In Andor, the court refused to follow the defendant's 
contention that the malfunctioning of a bolt on the landing gear of the defendant's plane caused 
the pilot to believe mistakenly that the plane's landing gear was not down and caused the 
plane to circle the airport until it ran out of gas and crashed, injuring the plaintiff passenger. 
Id. The occurrences were deemed foreseeable and not so highly extraordinary as to relieve 
the defendant of liability. I d. 
157 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974) 
158 Id. at 216. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 218. The appellate judge followed two Illinois Supreme Court opinions: Cunis v. 
Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974), and Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 
N.E.2d 307 (1973). The appellate judge took a very limited approach toward applying the 
doctrine of highly extraordinary causation. 509 F.2d at 217-18. 
161 269 Or. 643, 525 P.2d 1299 (1974). 
162 Id. at 646, 525 P.2d at 1301. The defendant gas station argued for the application of 
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defendant gas station ignited the coat. l63 Even though the circum-
stances of the case appeared bizarre, the Oregon Supreme Court 
found section 435(2) inapplicable and held both defendants liable. 164 
The hindsight requirement of section 435(2) creates a very high 
standard for its application. 165 When looking at the consequences of 
a defendant's conduct after the event, the consequences always will 
appear less extraordinary.l66 I:Jindsight can make consequences ap-
pear ordinary even if the results of the act seemed or would seem 
extremely unusual at the moment of that act. 167 Section 435(2) may 
be applied only if, after taking this retrospective view, the conse-
quences still appear so highly extraordinary as to prevent the de-
fendant's conduct from being considered a legal cause of them. 168 
As stated in section 435(1), the counterpart to section 435(2), if 
the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plain-
tiff's injuries, the foreseeability of the manner in which the plaintiff 
was injured or the extent of the plaintiff's injuries is irrelevant to 
liability determinations. 169 Because of the hindsight requirement, 
section 435(2), but the court refused to apply it because they found that the highly flammable 
nature of the coat and the fire caused by the gas station were both substantial factors in 
causing the plaintiff's injuries. [d. at 659-60, 525 P.2d at 1306-07. The court found liability 
even though defendant J.C. Penney's negligence had a predominant effect on the harm being 
inflicted to such a great extent. [d. This court applied § 435(1) of the Restatement in making 
its decision. [d. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
163 [d. at 646, 659-60, 525 P.2d at 1301, 1306-07. 
164 [d. at 659-60, 525 P.2d at 1306-07. 
165 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) & comments c, d, e (1965). Comments c, d, 
and e discuss § 435(2) and its statement that hindsight should be applied in determining if the 
harm to the plaintiff by the defendant's conduct was highly extraordinary. Prosser has stated 
that comment e of the Restatement "is unfortunate in the stress which it lays on retrospective 
knowledge of all the facts, for to omniscience any event whatever must appear not only 
probable but quite inevitable; but the basic idea is there, that liability must stop somewhere 
short of the freakish and the fantastic." Prosser, supra note 10, at 27; see Wilson v. American 
Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 1966) (reversed trial court's decision because 
the trial judge improperly instructed the jury to consider whether the defendant should have 
prospectively envisaged the events rather than properly instructing the jury to apply hind-
sight). 
166 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(2) comment d states: 
[d. 
[TJhe court not only knows the stage setting which existed at the time of the 
defendant's negligence and which mayor may not have persisted throughout, but it 
also follows the effects of the actor's negligence as it passes from phase to phase until 
it results in harm to the plaintiff. 
167 [d. 
168 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965). 
169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) (1965). This section provides that "[iJf the 
actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the 
actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which 
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section 435(2) does not require that the defendant actually foresaw 
the consequences resulting from the negligent conduct. 170 Moreover, 
the fact that a reasonable person in the defendant's shoes would not 
have foreseen the consequences of the conduct does not necessarily 
relieve the defendant of liability. l7l 
V. THE USE OF SECTION 435(2) IN A HAZARDOUS WASTE TORT 
CASE: ANDERSON V. W.R. GRACE & CO. 
Causation difficulties often plague hazardous waste tort cases. 
Complex and uncertain evidence of causation was an enormous part 
of one hazardous waste case in particular, Anderson v. W.R. Grace 
& CO.172 In Anderson the court took a unique approach in dealing 
with the causation problems it faced. Section 435(2) played a deter-
minative role in the court's approach.173 
In Anderson leukemia and other serious illnesses struck a signif-
icant number of people, mostly children, in a small community in 
and around Woburn, Massachusetts. 174 Scientists found dangerous 
concentrations of trichloroethylene (TCE) and other toxic chemical 
solvents in two municipal wells that supplied Woburn with some of 
its water supply.175 The residents of the community who suffered 
extensive injuries were using water from those wells. 176 Scientists 
also found that industrial land in Woburn surrounding the wells was 
contaminated with high levels of hazardous wastes including TCE.177 
The victims brought suit in the Federal District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts alleging state law tort claims against the 
it occurred does not prevent him from being liable." [d.; see F. HARPER, supra note 5, § 20.5, 
at 147; Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308,311,414 N.E.2d 666,670 (1980); 
Brown v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 805 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1986). 
170 [d. 
171 [d. 
172 No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986), aff'd sub nom. Anderson v. Cryovac, 862 F.2d 
910 (1st Cir. 1988). 
173 Pacelle, supra note 9, at 78, cols. 2-4. 
174 Most of these injuries included death or disability from leukemia. Anderson, 862 F.2d 
at 914. 
175 [d. at 913. 
176 [d. at 914. 
177 See Pacelle, supra note 9, at 76, col. 2. The land had a long history of industrial use for 
leather tanning facilities, as well as pesticide and chemical factories. [d. The Woburn site was 
ranked as one of the 10 worst hazardous waste sites in the United States. See Announcement 
of Anne M. Gorusch, Administrator, EPA (Oct. 23, 1981), reprinted in 115 Worst U.S. Dump 
Sites Targeted for Cleanup Under Superfund Program, [Current Developments] 12 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 808, 828 (1981); Comment, supra note 2, at 799. 
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owners of the contaminated land surrounding the municipal wells. 178 
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants improperly dumped or 
allowed others to dump toxic chemicals on the land, resulting in the 
contamination of the municipal wells. 179 They further claimed that 
the contamination of the wells caused the extensive injuries suffered 
by people who used the water from those wells. 180 
After more than four years of exhaustive discovery on all issues 
of the case, the judge dealt a damaging procedural blow to the 
plaintiffs' case. 181 The trial judge ordered the case bifurcated, under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), into four mini-trials on certain 
issues of the case. 182 On March 10, 1986, the first trial on the issue 
of causation began, and for four months the parties presented evi-
dence regarding the contamination of the municipal wells. 183 Most of 
the evidence involved expert testimony as to the groundwater flow 
around the wells. l84 The plaintiffs' evidence regarding the presence 
and dumping of the hazardous chemicals centered around the period 
between the late 1950s and mid-1960s. 185 Each party's expert testi-
mony strongly contradicted the expert testimony of the other, and 
the entire issue involved a great deal of scientific uncertainty. 186 
After both sides presented their evidence, the trial judge ruled 
on the defendants' motions for directed verdicts, dealing another 
serious blow to the plaintiffs' case. 187 All of these directed verdict 
rulings influenced the case, but one of the judge's rulings in partic-
178 See Anderson, No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986). The case was in federal court 
on the grounds of diversity. Anderson, 862 F.2d at 914. 
179 Anderson, 862 F.2d at 914. Wells G and H in East Woburn were closed on May 22, 
1979, after it was discovered that they contained high levels of carcinogenic toxic solvents, 
including trichloroethylene, trichloroethane, transdicloroethylene, benzene, and chloroform. 
Id. at 913; Comment, supra note 2, at 799 n.13. 
180 Anderson, 862 F.2d at 914. 
181 See id.; Pacelle, supra note 9, at 77, col. 2. 
182 Anderson, 862 F.2d at 914. The first trial would determine whether the defendants 
caused the contamination of the municipal wells and thus, the plaintiffs' drinking water during 
a certain period in which the defendant could be held liable. Id. The second trial would 
determine whether the contaminants released by the defendants caused the plaintiffs' leuke-
mia. Id. The third trial would decide whether the injuries other than leukemia were caused 
by the defendants. Id. Finally, the fourth trial would involve the assessment of damages. Id.; 
see Pacelle, supra note 9, at 77, col. 2; Comment, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation at an Extreme: 
Polyfurcation of Liability Issues in Environmental Tort Cases, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 123 (1989) (authored by Albert P. Bedecarre) (exhaustive discussion of polyfurcation in 
environmental tort cases). 
183 Pacelle, supra note 9, at 77, col. 4. 
184 I d. at 78, col. 1. 
185 Id. at 78, col. 4. 
186 See id. at 78, cols. 1-4. 
187 Anderson, 862 F.2d at 914. 
1991] CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORTS 797 
ular was the most important decision of the trial. 188 The judge applied 
section 435(2) and a foreseeability test to determine that the defen-
dants only could be liable for conduct within a particular time period, 
during which the defendants could have foreseen or could have had 
knowledge that their conduct could harm others. 189 
The judge in Anderson applied Cardozo's reasoning in Palsgraf 
and found that the defendants owed a duty only to those people they 
could reasonably foresee injuring as a result of their negligence. 190 
The judge ruled that a duty not to pollute drinking water negligently 
did not exist, at least until the municipal wells were built near the 
defendants' land. The judge also ruled that the jury could not con-
sider any evidence of toxic waste on the defendants' land before 
October 1, 1964, or after May 22, 1979, because the first of the 
municipal wells was completed in October of 1964 and the wells were 
closed on May 22, 1979.191 
In the case against co-defendant Beatrice Food Company, the 
judge further limited jury consideration to a period after August 27, 
1968, and before May 22, 1979. 192 Beatrice's predecessor-in-interest 
received a letter on August 27, 1968, from an environmental con-
sultant stating that the water table on the Beatrice land was affected 
by the pumping of the municipal wells. 193 The judge reasoned that 
before the 1968 notice, it was highly extraordinary that the defen-
dant could have foreseen injury to the plaintiffs from hazardous 
wastes located on the defendant's land. The judge ruled that under 
the facts of the case it was highly extraordinary that the defendant's 
dumping before 1968 should have brought about the plaintiffs' 
188 Pacelle, supra note 9, at 78, col. 2. There were primarily four decisions made in the 
directed verdict orders. Anderson, 862 F.2d at 914. The most important decision was to have 
the jury consider only the conduct of the defendant that occurred during a particular time 
period. [d. The other decisions were as follows. First, three of the chemicals listed in the 
complaint were excluded from consideration by the jury. Second, even though defendant 
Beatrice engaged in ultrahazardous activity, they could not be held strictly liable because 
they lacked the requisite intent. [d. Third, the defendants could not be liable for negligent 
failure to warn because the plaintiff failed to present adequate evidence of a special relationship 
between the defendants and the plaintiffs to establish a duty to warn. [d. 
189 Memorandum and Order on Motions for Directed Verdicts (June 9, 1986), Anderson v. 
W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-1672-S, slip op. at 2 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986). The judge later 
instructed the jury that "[tlhere can be no reasonably foreseeable risk by reason of the 
contamination of drinking water unless there exists a group of people likely to drink the water 
involved." Instructions to the Jury, Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. 
1986); Pacelle, supra note 9, at 78, cols. 2-3. 
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harm. 194 Therefore, he applied section 435(2) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts and found that Beatrice's conduct prior to 1968 
could not be the legal cause of the plaintiffs' harm. 195 
In Anderson, the evidence of groundwater flow in the area around 
the municipal wells was complicated and hotly disputed between the 
parties. 196 The Alberjon River separated Beatrice's land, upon which 
alleged dumping of hazardous wastes occurred, from the municipal 
wells in question. 197 The plaintiffs' experts stated that the toxic 
solvents, after entering the aquifer,198 probably were pulled by the 
pumping action of the two nearby municipal wells, under the Alber-
jon River and against the normal groundwater flow, into those 
wells. 199 The defendants' experts stated that the only water entering 
the municipal wells probably came from water traveling with the 
groundwater flow to the wells or from the Alberjon River.20o All of 
the experts stated that the flow of the groundwater and the migra-
tion of the toxins could not be determined with exact certainty 
because too many variables were involved in the scientific evidence 
of groundwater flow and the pumping effects of the wells. 201 
The jury's only role in the case against Beatrice was to answer a 
limited special interrogatory submitted to them. 202 In answering the 
194 [d. 
195 [d. Scientific uncertainty as to the groundwater flow in the area in question contributed 
to the judge's determination that the causation sequence appeared highly extraordinary. 
Hydrogeology is not an exact science, and predictions of groundwater flow are rarely definite. 
Chow, Preface to HANDBOOK OF ApPLIED HYDROLOGY, at ix (V. Chow ed. 1964). The predic-
tions of groundwater flow are based upon the experience and judgment of the hydrologist. [d. 
Groundwater flow is affected by many natural and man-made factors. Todd, Groundwater, in 
HANDBOOK OF ApPLIED HYDROLOGY, at 13-7 (V. Chowed. 1964). The flow of water beneath 
the surface of the ground often does very unpredictable and seemingly highly extraordinary 
things. See id. at 13-2 to 13-52. 
196 Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-1672-S, slip op. at 2 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986). 
197 [d. 
198 An aquifer is an underground layer of permeable rock, sand, gravel, etc. containing 
water. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 69 (2d college ed. 1970). 
199 [d. 
200 [d. 
201 [d.; see Todd, supra note 195, at 13-7 to 13-46. 
202 Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986). The special 
interrogatory read: 
[d. 
Have the plaintiffs established by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the 
following chemicals were disposed of at the Beatrice site after August 27, 1968 and 
substantially contributed to the contamination of Wells G and H by these chemicals 
prior to May 22, 1979? 
(a) Trichloroethylene 
(b) Tetrachloroethylene 
(c) 1,2 Transdichloroethylene 
(d) 1,1,1, Trichlorethane. 
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interrogatory, the jury stated that the plaintiff had not established 
that any of the toxic chemicals in question were disposed of at the 
Beatrice site after August 27, 1968, and therefore did not substan-
tially contribute to the contamination of the wells prior to May 22, 
1979.203 The plaintiff then objected, claiming that the interrogatory 
was not adequate for jury consideration. The judge overruled the 
objection, made findings on the issues not determined by the inter-
rogatory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a), and entered 
a judgment for Beatrice Food Company.204 
In summary, the judge in Anderson made findings limiting the 
extent to which the defendants could be held liable.205 The judge 
determined that the jury could only consider evidence of the defen-
dants' actions after the defendants could have known that their 
actions could cause harm.206 These noteworthy rulings were vital to 
the jury's verdict of not responsible for Beatrice. 207 
VI. GUIDELINES FOR THE ApPLICATION OF RESTATEMENT 
SECTION 435(2) 
The concept of causation in negligence law is riddled with confu-
sion.208 Concrete rules and formulas regarding causation seem im-
possible and consistently have met with failure. 209 The courts should 
be guided by the particular facts of each case and by general concepts 
203 [d. 
204 [d.; see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) to understand how the judge was able to 
make findings on issues omitted from the interrogatory. Rule 49(a) states: 
[d. 
If in [submitting special interrogatories to the jury] the court omits any issue of 
fact raised by the pleadings or the evidence, each party waives the right to a trial 
by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires the party demands its 
submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may 
make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in 
accord with the judgment on the final verdict. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision 
in Anderson, holding that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a), the plaintiff lost the 
right to appeal this issue due to the plaintiff's failure seasonably to object to the special 
interrogatories submitted to the jury. Anderson, 862 F.2d at 922. If the plaintiff had wanted 
the jury to consider issues not in the special interrogatory, such as the pre-1968 dumping of 
hazardous wastes, or had wanted the judge to give special instructions to the jury, then the 
plaintiff was obligated to make an objection prior to the submission of the interrogatory to 
the jury. The appellate court deferred to the lower court and held that the district court's 
failure to admit the evidence of the pre-1968 pollution was not prejudicial error. [d. 
205 [d. 
206 [d. 
207 [d.; Pacelle, supra note 9, at 78, col. 4. 
208 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
209 See Prosser, supra note 10, at 32 ("the mule don't kick according to no rule"). 
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regarding the determination whether a reasonable link between neg-
ligent conduct and harm to the plaintiff exists.21o 
If courts take certain considerations into account before applying 
section 435(2) in making liability determinations, then more consis-
tent results will ensue and toxic tort plaintiffs will have, when ap-
propriate, a more reasonable chance of recovering for their injuries. 
First, before making any final liability decision, courts should con-
sider many factors and policy matters-only one of which is the 
doctrine espoused by section 435(2).211 Second, section 435(2) is not 
an ordinary foreseeability test because it sets a high standard; if a 
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in producing harm, 
section 435(2) relieves the defendant only when causal links appear 
highly extraordinary in retrospect. 212 Third, questions of fact should 
be resolved by the jury and not by the judge.213 Finally, a court can 
find causation even though the manner of injury involves some un-
certainty. 214 
Public policy inevitably influences proximate-cause and liability 
decisions in negligence cases. 215 One such policy, embodied in section 
435(2), states that a defendant should not be liable for consequences 
that in retrospect appear highly extraordinary.216 As a statement of 
policy, section 435(2) should not be considered a hard and fast rule, 
and courts should examine all of the circumstances and policy con-
siderations involved in each case before applying section 435(2) to 
determine that liability should not result from certain negligent 
conduct. 217 Another policy that may apply to toxic tort cases based 
210 [d. 
211 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text; infra notes 215-20 and accompanying 
text; see also Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 341-42, 430 A.2d 1, 15 (1980); Morgan 
v. District of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1102, 1111 (D.C. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 452 A.2d 
1197 (D.C.), afi'd en bane, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983); Petraglia v. Moller & Rothe, Inc., 119 
A.D.2d 494,496,500 N.Y.S.2d 690,692 (1986); Andor v. United Air Lines, 79 Or. App. 311, 
318-19, 719 P.2d 492, 497, 499 (1986). 
212 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text; infra notes 221-23 and accompanying 
text. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) comments d, e (1965). 
213 See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text; infra notes 224--33 and accompanying 
text. 
214 [d. § 435(1); see infra notes 234-43 and accompanying text. 
215 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 264, § 42, at 273. See also supra 
notes 65-68 and accompanying text. There are many factors to be considered by a court in 
negligence cases and this Comment does not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of those 
factors. 
216 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965). 
217 [d. § 435(2) comment e. Comment e provides: 
It is impossible to state any definite rules by which it can be determined that a 
particular result of the actor's negligent conduct is or is not so highly extraordinary 
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on negligence finds that the burden of personal injuries caused by 
hazardous wastes should be borne, when appropriate, by the indus-
tries negligently handling or producing that waste, rather than by 
the injured parties.218 At the same time, Congress, meanwhile, in 
an effort to achieve another policy goal, has exerted efforts to dis-
cover and implement methods to reduce the burdens facing plaintiffs 
claiming personal injury damages in hazardous waste tort cases.219 
Public policy also indicates that negligent actors should be liable for 
harm that their negligence was a substantial factor in producing, 
regardless of the foreseeability of the way in which the harm oc-
curred or the extent of the plaintiff's injuries unless it appears highly 
extraordinary that the harm in question resulted from their conduct 
or was the result of a superseding cause. 220 
The doctrine of law presented by section 435(2) is different from 
the test of foreseeability that must be met before a defendant can 
be held liable. 221 Foreseeability is required only in establishing a 
defendant's liability for negligence to the extent that, in looking at 
the circumstances from the perspective of the defendant at the time 
the alleged negligent act occurred, a reasonable person in the defen-
dant's position should have foreseen some injury to someone from 
his actions. 222 Section 435(2), on the other hand, sets forth a doctrine 
that provides that a wrongdoer should not be liable for damages if, 
in viewing the circumstances with hindsight and applying retrospec-
as to prevent the conduct from being a legal cause of that result. This is a matter 
for the judgment of the court formulated after the event, and therefore, with the 
knowledge of the effect that was produced. 
Id.; see also Prosser, supra note 10, at 32. See generally GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE 
CAUSE (1927). Green states that strict formulas are useless in proximate cause determinations 
because proximate cause is based upon interest balancing and policy. I d. at 65. 
218 See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 8, at 484-85; Farber, supra note 2, at 1226-27; Comment, 
supra note 2, at 850-52; Developments, supra note 2, at 1611. This aspect of public policy 
seems obvious because victims deserve compensation from those who caused their injury. 
Developments, supra note 2, at 1611-13. There is, however, an argument to be made that 
compensation of injured parties by American industries is a cause of the United States trade 
deficit and inability to compete internationally. This argument was set forth in a two-page 
advertisement by American International Group, America's largest underwriter of commercial 
and industrial insurance in America. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1989, at 64-65. Industry needs to 
be held accountable for their harmful actions, and, unlike the situation in some other nations, 
American industry usually needs to be sued in order to take on such responsibility for their 
actions. 
219 See supra notes 22--31 and accompanying text. 
220 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965). 
221 See supra notes 86-88, 165-68 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965). 
= See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
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tive knowledge of all the conditions present at the time of the de-
fendant's conduct, it appears highly extraordinary that the wrong-
doing caused those damages. 223 
In order to enable courts to make rational decisions based on the 
evidence, the proper role of the judge must be distinguished from 
the role of the jury.224 Most courts agree that a judge may apply 
section 435(2) to determine that, as a matter of law, a defendant 
should not be liable for their negligent conduct if the consequences 
of that conduct appear, in retrospect, highly extraordinary.225 It is 
well established, however, that disputes of fact and conflicts among 
experts should be resolved by the jury.226 The application of section 
435(2) acts as a directed verdict in which a judge finds that, as a 
matter of law, there can be only one verdict. 227 Determinations as a 
matter of law should be made on factual matters by a trial judge 
only if no reasonable minds could disagree on the facts. 228 A judge 
should preserve the jury's discretion and duty to determine material 
facts and apply legal concepts that are open to evaluative determi-
nations, such as foreseeability tests, in order to resolve factual dis-
putes. 229 A judge should apply section 435(2) to bar liability only 
when, as in directed verdicts, it appears incontrovertible that the 
defendants should not be held liable for their conduct. 230 
If the particular events in a case appear so extraordinary that, as 
a matter of law, the defendant should not be held liable, then the 
223 See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 435(2) (1965). 
224 See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text. See also Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 741 F. 
Supp. 1472, 1511 (D. Kan. 1990) (underlying reason for the jury system of factfinding is to 
"see that a fair trial occurs, that truth is found, and that justice is done on the evidence"); L. 
GREEN, supra note 1, at 65-66. 
225 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 435(2) (1965). 
226 E.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Ferebee the 
court stated that "[tlhe case was thus a classic battle of experts, a battle in which the jury 
must decide the victor." Id. at 1535. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 434 (1965). 
227 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). 
228 See id.; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 45, at 321. 
229 See id.; see also United States v. Dretke, 707 F.2d 978, 982 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 942 (1983). Some courts and commentators have stated that a judge may make comments 
about the facts in a case as long as the judge instructs the jury that they are the sole finder 
of facts and that the comments are not binding and as long as the judge's comments are not 
highly prejudicial to the parties. Wilson v. Bicycle South, Inc., 915 F.2d 1503, 1508 (11th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Hope, 714 F.2d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 1983). Judges, however, are 
limited in the comments they may make on the facts and must preserve the jury's function to 
determine material facts. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726, 738 (2d Cir. 
1973). 
230 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965). 
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judge should direct a verdict relieving the defendant of liability. 231 
Otherwise, foreseeability should be looked at as just one of the 
important factual issues to be reviewed by the jury in their proxi-
mate-cause determinations. 232 Such an approach could strike a bal-
ance between the interests in not permitting the trial judge to invade 
the jury's duty to make factual determinations and the risk of allow-
ing a sympathetic jury to find liability even when extraordinary 
circumstances were involved. 233 
In considering whether to apply the policy of not holding an oth-
erwise negligent actor liable for highly extraordinary occurrences, a 
court should keep in mind that the evidence offered to establish 
causation often cannot be presented with a high degree of cer-
tainty.234 This is especially true in toxic torts cases, when evidence 
is often at the vanguard of scientific knowledge.235 In toxic torts 
cases, plaintiffs have the difficult task of proving that their exposure 
to a particular toxic substance caused their injury and that the 
defendant's conduct was the cause of their exposure to that partic-
ular toxic substance. 236 In hazardous waste tort cases, a plaintiff 
usually will have to prove that contaminants moved through the 
groundwater into the water supply and that the contaminants caused 
plaintiff's disease. 237 Both groundwater movement and medical cau-
sation of cancer rarely can be proven with a high degree of cer-
tainty.238 
In order to prevail in a traditional tort case, a plaintiff must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
acted negligently and that the plaintiff's injury was more-likely-
than-not a result of the defendant's negligent acts. 239 This standard 
231 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 45, at 321; see 
also supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
232 Nelson by Tatum v. Com. Edison Co., 124 Ill. App. 3d 661, 659, 465 N.E.2d 513, 519 
(1984); B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 139,538 A.2d 1178 (1988) (the foreseeability test, whether 
in the context of causation or duty, "is intended to reflect current societal standards with 
respect to an acceptable nexus between the negligent act and the ensuing harm"). 
233 Id. 
234 See Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 
210-11 (1981); Comment, supra note 2, at 814-15; see, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 
No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986), a/I'd sub nom. Anderson v. Cryovac, 862 F.2d 910 
(1st Cir. 1988); In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Benedictin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 
1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983). 
235 Brennan, supra note 8, at 491; see supra note 234. 
236 See In re "Agent Orange", 100 F.R.D. at 721; Anderson, 862 F.2d at 914. 
237 See, e.g., Anderson, 862 F.2d at 914. 
238 See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text. 
239 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) (1965); see supra notes 169-71 and accom-
panying text. 
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is difficult to meet in toxic tort cases because the scientific evidence 
necessary is usually incapable of being established to a degree of 
certainty high enough to meet the burden of proof. 240 Our legal 
system should be aware of the problems toxic tort plaintiffs encoun-
ter in attempting to establish sufficient causal proof and courts 
should adopt, as in Allen v. United States, more reasonable stan-
dards of proof for victims of toxic substances.241 If plaintiffs succeed 
in establishing that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor 
in producing their injury or that there is a sufficient factual connec-
tion between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm, then 
the foreseeability of the manner or extent of harm should no longer 
be an issue unless it appears highly extraordinary that the defen-
dant's conduct caused the resulting harm.242 Especially in hazardous 
waste tort cases, the court should examine all the circumstances of 
a case to ensure that they are using hindsight in making any decision 
regarding section 435(2).243 
In Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co. the court wrestled with a great 
deal of disputed and uncertain scientific evidence. 244 The greatest 
amount of scientific uncertainty in the Anderson case arose in a 
dispute over groundwater movement and whether pollutants on the 
land owned by defendant Beatrice could have passed into municipal 
wells situated nearby.245 Beatrice's experts stated that it was nearly 
impossible for the pollutants to pass into the wells. 246 The plaintiffs' 
experts stated that the toxins on Beatrice's land probably entered 
the wells, but they stated that the groundwater movement in the 
area could not be determined with a high degree of certainty. 247 
The dispute between the experts as to groundwater flow should 
have been left to the jury.248 Conflicts between experts, like the one 
240 See Farber, supra note 2, at 1225-27; Comment, supra note 2, at 814-15; Developments, 
supra note 2, at 1611-12. 
241 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text; Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 
247, 260 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 
(1988). 
242 See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, 
supra note 2, § 41 at 263. 
243 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) comment d, e (1965); see supra note 
217. 
244 Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-1672-S, slip op. at 2-4 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986); 
see supra notes 172-207 and accompanying text. 
245 Anderson, No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986); Pacelle, supra note 6, at 78, cols. 
2-3. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra notes 197-99, 201 and accompanying text. 
248 See supra notes 132-42, 224--30 and accompanying text. 
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present in Anderson, should be resolved by the jury if any reason-
able person could differ as to the experts' findings. 249 The findings 
of both sides' experts in this case were open to different interpre-
tations and were not to a collateral matter, but were crucial in 
determining that portion of the bifurcated trial that was before the 
court; whether the defendant's conduct caused the contamination of 
the wells. 250 Therefore, it was wrong for the judge to take relevant 
and disputed factual issues away from jury consideration. 251 
Although some of the toxins that injured the plaintiffs most likely 
came from parties other than Beatrice, the jury should have been 
left to determine whether the toxins on Beatrice's land were a sub-
stantial factor in causing the contamination of the municipal wells.252 
A reasonable juror could have found that Beatrice's conduct was a 
substantial factor in causing the well contamination, and the jury 
should have been left to make a proper determination of liability 
based on all the evidence. 253 
The use of section 435(2) in Anderson limited the evidence the 
jury was to consider.254 In answering special interrogatories regard-
ing Beatrice's liability for contaminating the wells, the jury was not 
to consider pollution on Beatrice's land dumped before August 29, 
1968.255 The judge determined that, because this was the date Be-
atrice received a letter from their environmental consultant stating 
that the water table on their land may be affected by the wells, this 
was the date on which the defendants were first put on notice that 
they may be contaminating the municipal wells. 256 The judge further 
reasoned that, before this notice, it was highly extraordinary that 
the contamination of the wells would result from Beatrice's negligent 
conduct in maintaining polluted land. 257 If applying hindsight, notice 
of the extent of possible risk created should not have made pre-
notice events appear any more extraordinary.258 In hindsight, the 
249 See id.; Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
250 Anderson, No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986); see supra notes 181-83 and accom-
panying text. 
251 Anderson, No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986); Pacelle, supra note 9, at 77. 
252 See supra notes 132-42, 224-30 and accompanying text; see also Pacelle, supra note 9, 
at 77. 
253 [d. 
254 See supra notes 187-95, 202-07 and accompanying text. 
255 See id.; Pacelle, supra note 9, at 78, cols. 2-3. 
256 See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986); supra 
notes 187-95, 202-07 and accompanying text. 
257 See id. 
258 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965). 
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letter received by Beatrice stating that the municipal wells were 
affecting the water table on defendant's land clearly indicates that 
the movement of negligently dumped toxins to the wells was not 
highly extraordinary.259 The receipt of the letter would go merely to 
the notice to the defendant of potential harm to other persons. Notice 
should be irrelevant in this kind of case because, if Beatrice's conduct 
was a substantial factor in producing the harm to the plaintiff, then 
the foreseeability of the manner in which the plaintiff was injured is 
irrelevant. 260 
The root of the problem with causation and liability determina-
tions, and possibly part of their solution, lies in the fact that there 
are no strict binding rules of causation. Determinations of proximate-
cause and liability should be based on a finding that the causal link 
between conduct and harm is reasonable. Such determinations 
should be made by the factfinder after a full examination of the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co. is the only notable toxic tort case 
applying section 435(2). There is, however, a possibility that courts 
may increase their use of section 435(2) in environmental cases be-
cause causation in hazardous waste toxic torts often requires the use 
of a large amount of evidence involving uncertain and novel scientific 
discoveries. 
Courts have adopted section 435(2) of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts to prevent liability from being imposed upon defendants 
when the consequences of their conduct were highly extraordinary 
and far beyond any reasonable apprehension of the risk created. A 
court applying section 435(2) analysis is required to take a retro-
spective look at the consequences of the defendant's conduct before 
it can find those consequences to be highly extraordinary. A court 
should realize that the hindsight requirement in looking at the cir-
cumstances of a case severely limits the possible applications of 
section 435(2). Unless the courts realize that section 435(2) has only 
259 See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986); supra 
notes 187-95, 202-07 and accompanying text. 
260 See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986); supra 
notes 86-88 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) 
(1965); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, §§ 41-45; Memorandum and Order on 
Motions for Directed Verdicts (June 9, 1986), Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-1672-S 
(D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1986), a/I'd sub nom. Anderson v. Cryovac, 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988). 
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very limited applications, it could be an excessively dangerous 
weapon for defendants, especially in hazardous waste tort cases, 
which involve a great amount of uncertainty in causation. 
A federal statute setting forth strict liability for personal injuries 
resulting from hazardous wastes, or an administrative body estab-
lished to allocate compensation for such injuries, could help solve 
the problems facing hazardous waste tort victims. At this time, 
however, in order to receive compensation, these victims must rely 
on suits based on tort. In the present tort system, a realization that 
liability in negligence is based on the general concept of fault, and 
not upon rigid rules of law, will help clear up some of the confusion 
of proximate-cause. Courts only should make directed verdict rulings 
on causation issues when no reasonable person could find that the 
defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries. The factfinder should decide 
causation issues by applying the general principles of tort law to the 
facts of each case. The courts can, and must, strike a proper balance 
between properly compensating victims of hazardous wastes and 
setting forth reasonable limits upon liability. 
